Negligence — Trampoline – Duty to Warn
Negligence — Trampoline – Duty to Warn
Where a plaintiff sustained a severe ankle injury while jumping on a trampoline at a facility owned and operated by the defendant, the entry of summary disposition in favor of the defendant should be affirmed despite the plaintiff’s contention that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendant violated the Trampoline Court Safety Act and whether the alleged violations caused his injury.
“Plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether [defendant] Spring Loaded II breached its duty to warn plaintiff of the risks associated with jumping on a trampoline at higher weights or the risks associated with jumping from one trampoline to another. We disagree.
“The surveillance video shows that plaintiff’s injury occurred just before he attempted to jump from one trampoline to another. Plaintiff jumped on the trampoline in order to gain momentum to traverse a small section of padded frame that joined the two trampolines. While jumping near the padded section, but before traversing the frame, plaintiff’s ankle buckled and he fell onto the trampoline. Based upon the surveillance video, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff accepted the inherent danger of sustaining an injury from landing on the trampoline or trampoline pad. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot recover unless his injury was otherwise attributable to Spring Loaded II’s breach of its common-law duties. MCL 691.1736.
“Plaintiff contends that product sellers have a duty to transmit safety-related information when they know or should know that the buyer or user is unaware of the information, and this duty may be attributed to a successor in possession of the product. Plaintiff posits that Spring Loaded II had a duty to transmit safety-related information to its patrons regarding the increased risks associated with patron weight and jumping from one trampoline to another because Spring Loaded II was a successor in possession of trampolines. In support of this premise, plaintiff relies upon Foster v Cone-Blanchard Mach Co, 460 Mich 696, 707; 597 NW2d 506 (1999), in which our Supreme Court held that ‘in certain circumstances a successor may have an independent duty to warn a predecessor’s customer of defects in a predecessor’s product.’ However, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that there were defects in the trampoline, and therefore, plaintiff’s reliance on Foster is misplaced. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Spring Loaded II had a duty to warn in this regard.
“Moreover, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding causation because plaintiff failed to present any evidence that he would not have used the trampolines if he had been warned about the increased risk of injury associated with higher weight or jumping from one trampoline to another.
“The circuit court properly granted Spring Loaded II’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Accordingly, we affirm.”
Dissenting judge’s comments
GLEICHER, J. “The majority holds that defendant did not violate any of the specific safety standards set forth in the act, and I agree. Unfortunately for trampoline users, few of the safety standards referenced in the act apply to trampoline court operators. But despite that plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from defendant’s alleged safety standard violations must fail for the reasons discussed by the majority, I would hold that plaintiff’s common-law failure to warn claim survives.”
Redmond v. Spring Loaded I LLC; MiLW 08-103807, 6 pages; Michigan Court of Appeals unpublished per curiam; K. F. Kelly, J., Riordan, J.; Gleicher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; on appeal from Macomb Circuit Court; Paul J. Dillon for appellant; Parisa R. Gold for appellee.
Read More: https://milawyersweekly.com/news/2021/05/29/negligence-trampoline-duty-to-warn/